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TEACHING THE TRANSFORMATIVE FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENT 
JOEL K. GOLDSTEIN* 
If the constitutional law casebooks are a reliable guide, most teach the 
Fourteenth Amendment, like other parts of the Constitution, by presenting 
separately the various doctrinal topics it has raised.1 The principal clauses of the 
Amendment, or really those in the second sentence of Section 12—the Equal 
Protection, Due Process, and Privileges or Immunities Clauses—are generally 
extracted from its text and classes are structured around the leading cases 
decided under each and the resulting doctrine. Cases under the Equal Protection 
or Due Process Clause may be further separated. Based on the class of claimants, 
for instance, the cases involving racial and gender equality and affirmative 
action may be presented as distinct topics. Further subdivision may group the 
cases involving education, employment, and voting, for instance. Sometimes 
equal protection and due process both appear, either because claimants raised, 
or opinions addressed, each constitutional hook or because an equal protection 
claim against the federal government was necessarily brought under the Fifth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Incorporation receives some, although much 
briefer, treatment, casebook page allocation suggests.3 
Some such conceptual approach is common and sensible. It is important for 
students to learn something about the history, doctrine, and analytical 
approaches regarding the various distinct clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
to read the important cases and understand the arguments the Court found 
convincing and those it rejected. And it is impossible to begin to understand the 
Fourteenth Amendment without studying its principal clauses. 
 
* Vincent C. Immel Professor of Law, Saint Louis University School of Law. 
 1. See, e.g., JESSE CHOPER ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES, COMMENTS, AND 
QUESTIONS (12th ed. 2013); NORMAN REDLICH, JOHN ATTANASIO & JOEL K. GOLDSTEIN, 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (5th ed. 2008); GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (7th 
ed. 2013); KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & NOAH FELDMAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (18th ed. 2013). 
 2. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1 (“No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge 
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person 
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction 
the equal protection of the laws.”). 
 3. See, e.g., CHOPER ET AL., supra note 1, at 396–414; REDLICH ET AL., supra note 1, at 380–
85; STONE ET AL., supra note 1, at 729–35; SULLIVAN & FELDMAN, supra note 1, at 446–65. 
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Yet the danger always exists, in studying constitutional law or anything else, 
that paying the necessary attention to the particulars may interfere with grasping 
the general, that a focus on specific clauses may hide wider truths, that 
examining the trees of constitutional law might obscure the forest. That’s 
certainly, and perhaps especially, true of the Fourteenth Amendment. The focus 
on the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses separately certainly and 
appropriately signals their importance as discrete constitutional provisions, yet 
unless the lens is pulled back a bit to allow a panoramic view it may not capture 
the extraordinary way that the Fourteenth Amendment has transformed the 
Constitution. 
That would be a huge loss. The Fourteenth Amendment has made the 
Constitution much more rights-focused and rights-protective, restructured the 
relationship between national and state government,4 and changed the role and 
work of branches of the national government, among other things. And it gave 
equality and fairness a more exalted and prominent place in American 
constitutional ideals, thereby recognizing and celebrating American pluralism as 
among the Constitution’s strengths and intrinsic and enduring commitments. 
The transformation occurred largely through the process of incorporation of 
rights as against the states and through the development of the Equal Protection 
and Due Process Clauses over time, and these three Fourteenth Amendment 
streams together have made the theory and practice of American constitutional 
government quite different from what previously existed. 
It is certainly not novel to recognize the transformative quality of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Writing nearly three decades ago, the distinguished 
constitutional scholar and federal judge Louis H. Pollak observed that during the 
twentieth century, “the scope of the fourteenth amendment has been, and 
remains, the most actively controverted complex of constitutional issues,”5 and 
nothing has undermined the truth of Judge Pollak’s judgment in the intervening 
years. William Araiza in his masterful study of the Fourteenth Amendment 
Enforcement Clause recently wrote that “it is nearly impossible to exaggerate 
the importance of the Fourteenth Amendment. It constitutes the central text of 
the second framing of the Constitution, in which federal constitutional rights 
were granted to Americans not just as against the federal government but also 
against their own states.”6  
 
 4. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 173 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“The Civil War 
Amendments dramatically altered the relation of the Federal Government to the States.”); see also 
ERNEST A. YOUNG, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE 192 (2012) 
(noting grants of power to Congress but arguing that “the more important shift was along the 
dimension of federalism”). 
 5. Louis H. Pollak, “Original Intention” and the Crucible of Litigation, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 
867, 878 (1989). 
 6. WILLIAM D. ARAIZA, ENFORCING THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE: CONGRESSIONAL 
POWER, JUDICIAL DOCTRINE, AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1–2 (2015); see also BERNARD 
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Yet recognition may not lead to classroom communication, especially since 
the need to study various clauses and associated doctrine and the pressures of 
curriculum coverage may distract from larger themes about constitutional 
interpretation and structure implicit in the Fourteenth Amendment. Unless 
constitutional law courses consider not simply the individual clauses of the 
Fourteenth Amendment but the way together they transformed the subject more 
generally, the courses may leave students with a distorted view of constitutional 
interpretation and an understated sense of the role of that Amendment. 
Constitutional amendments come so rarely that all are special but even 
within that rarified group the Fourteenth Amendment has had an exceptional 
impact. It is a nice coincidence that it occupies the exact midpoint of the twenty-
seven constitutional amendments. That fortuity regarding its current 
constitutional placement symbolizes the pivotal role it plays in the constitutional 
structure. 
This Essay will begin with some general background in Part I to place the 
Fourteenth Amendment in some historical context. Part II will sketch how 
incorporation, substantive due process, and the Equal Protection Clause changed 
the Constitution in ways that went beyond the doctrine they introduced. Part III 
will extract some larger lessons regarding the way in which these doctrines 
transformed constitutional interpretation and government more generally which 
are worth sharing with students. 
I.  THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
The Constitution as initially ratified specifically protected relatively few 
rights. It was, of course, amended twelve times during roughly the first fifteen 
years following its adoption to include, among other provisions, the Bill of 
Rights, but these guarantees protected individuals against certain actions by the 
national, not by state, government. Indeed, the Supreme Court held in Barron v. 
Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, one of Chief Justice John Marshall’s last 
opinions, that constitutional clauses which use general language only protect 
individual rights as against federal, not state, action.7 The Constitution only 
constrained state action when it so specified, for instance, by enjoining “No state 
shall . . .” as it does repeatedly in Article I, Section 10. Accordingly, the pre-
Civil War Constitution protected very few rights, most of which ran as against 
the federal government only, and state governments had relatively great latitude 
 
SCHWARTZ, FROM CONFEDERATION TO NATION: THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION, 1835–1877, at 
190 (1973) (“From a legal point of view, the changes [from the Civil War Amendments] were 
fundamental, for they made for a nationalization of civil rights that was completely to transform 
the constitutional system. The protection of life, liberty, and property now became a national 
responsibility—federalizing, as it were, the vindication of individual rights throughout the land.”). 
 7. 32 U.S. 243, 250–51 (1833). 
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to regulate except to the extent that state laws conflicted with federal legislation 
or state constitutions. 
And, of course, most significantly, the Constitution accepted African-
American slavery, an institution and practice which treated African Americans 
as property while denying their equal humanity. The Court gave voice to that 
view in the infamous Dred Scott decision.8 
So things remained until the Civil War. That traumatic event was, of course, 
a monumental turning point in American history, and not surprisingly the 
constitutional structure that emerged after it was quite different from the prior 
regime. The aftermath produced new constitutional texts that reflected, allowed, 
and inspired changed arrangements. As Justice Thurgood Marshall put it in a 
May 1987 speech marking the Constitution’s bicentennial, while “[T]he Union 
survived the civil war, the Constitution did not. In its place arose a new, more 
promising basis for justice and equality, the 14th Amendment, ensuring 
protection of the life, liberty, and property of all persons against deprivations 
without due process, and guaranteeing equal protection of the laws.”9 Whereas 
the Bill of Rights had restrained national, not state, government, the three Civil 
War amendments imposed restraints on state, and in some cases national, 
government. Moreover, each empowered Congress to enforce its terms, a radical 
departure from the prior twelve amendments which had explicitly or implicitly 
limited Congress. 
Yet even among the three Civil War amendments, the Fourteenth 
Amendment stands out. The Thirteenth and Fifteenth Amendments each rather 
succinctly addressed one specific, although highly significant, subject: 
prohibiting slavery and conferring the right of African Americans to vote, 
respectively. By contrast, the Fourteenth Amendment is striking in the number 
of topics covered and its combination of specific problem-solving and 
articulation of more abstract concepts. 
The Fourteenth Amendment is the wordiest amendment and much of its 
length comes in the three middle clauses of the Amendment which now receive 
little attention. Section 2 replaced the Three-Fifths Clause in the original 
Constitution with a provision that counted blacks as full persons for purposes of 
determining representation in the House of Representatives so long as twenty-
one-year old male citizens were not disenfranchised in federal or state elections 
except for participation in rebellion or crime. That provision became necessary 
especially, ironically, after the Thirteenth Amendment converted southern 
slaves to free persons. That highly-desired outcome, coupled with the possibility 
that southern blacks, though free, would be denied the vote, had one potentially 
 
 8. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857). 
 9. Remarks of Thurgood Marshall at the Annual Seminar of the San Francisco Patent and 
Trademark Law Association (May 6, 1987), in THURGOOD MARSHALL: HIS SPEECHES, WRITINGS, 
ARGUMENTS, OPINIONS, AND REMINISCENCES 284 (Mark V. Tushnet ed., 2001). 
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dire consequence. It threatened to give the South a windfall in representatives 
and presidential electors without making its electorate more inclusive. Section 2 
was designed to obviate that threat by linking increased southern political power 
to enfranchisement of African Americans.10 Section 3 excluded from federal or 
state office anyone who had violated an oath to support the Constitution unless 
Congress removed the disability. Section 4 guaranteed the national debt and 
prohibited Congress from assuming the Confederacy’s debt or compensating 
slave owners for the emancipation of slaves. 
Although much of the debate regarding the Fourteenth Amendment focused 
on these intermediate sections,11 the Amendment’s first section provided the 
new constitutional provisions that transformed constitutional doctrine going 
forward. The first sentence of Section 1 contains the Citizenship Clause which 
makes U.S. citizenship a function of birth or naturalization and bases state 
citizenship simply on the residence decision of a U.S. citizen, thereby 
overturning the infamous Dred Scott decision.12 The second sentence contains 
three clauses inhibiting state action abridging the privileges or immunities of 
U.S. citizens, or depriving any person of life, liberty, or property without due 
process of law or the equal protection of the laws. Section 5 grants Congress 
legislative power to enforce the rest of the Amendment, including Section 1. 
The Fourteenth Amendment is relatively unique. Unlike most other 
amendments, it addresses multiple topics. Unlike the first twelve amendments, 
it confers rights as against the states. And especially in the second sentence of 
Section 1, it confers rights in language that is more general and more abstract 
than is otherwise common. 
The trilogy of rights in Section 1’s second sentence might have been viewed 
as a package of rights, sort of a belt-and-suspenders approach to ensure that 
African Americans would enjoy the benefits of equal treatment going forward.13 
The Privileges or Immunities Clause seems to confer certain unspecified 
substantive rights,14 the Due Process Clause seems to assure procedural 
regularity before a person is deprived of something important, and the Equal 
Protection Clause seems to guarantee identical treatment at law absent some 
appropriate basis for discriminating.15 
 
 10. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2. 
 11. BERNARD SCHWARTZ, FROM CONFEDERATION TO NATION: THE AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTION, 1835–1877, at 197–98 (1973). 
 12. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 454. 
 13. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 23–24 
(1980). 
 14. See ARAIZA, supra note 6, at 31 (“Today, many scholars believe that any substantive rights 
the drafters intended the amendment bestow were granted by the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause.”). 
 15. ELY, supra note 13, at 24. 
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That was not, however, the path constitutional doctrine traveled. In the 
Slaughter-House Cases16 in 1872, the Court rendered the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause essentially a constitutional nullity.17 There, white butchers 
claimed that a butchering monopoly Louisiana’s state government established 
violated their rights under the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments to 
practice their lawful trade.18 The plaintiffs’ argument carried the implication that 
the Constitution limited state legislative power to encumber their right to 
practice their trade (and presumably many other rights), thereby suggesting a 
dramatic shift of power from the states by virtue of a new constitutional norm 
and the aggrandizement of the Court as constitutional interpreter and Congress 
as its enforcer. Justice Miller emphatically rejected19 the premise that the 
Fourteenth Amendment “radically changes the whole theory of the relations of 
the State and Federal governments to each other and of both these governments 
to the people.”20 Writing for a five-justice majority, he interpreted narrowly each 
of the three clauses in the second sentence of Section 1 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. He essentially limited the Equal Protection Clause to claims by 
 
 16. 83 U.S. 36 (1873). 
 17. RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., THE DYNAMIC CONSTITUTION: AN INTRODUCTION TO 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 81 (2004); see also Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 521 (1999) 
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Court all but read the Privileges or Immunities Clause out of the 
Constitution in the Slaughter-House Cases.”). 
 18. Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. at 43. 
 19. Id. at 77–78 (“All this and more must follow, if the proposition of the plaintiffs in error be 
sound. For not only are these rights subject to the control of Congress whenever in its discretion 
any of them are supposed to be abridged by State legislation, but that body may also pass laws in 
advance, limiting and restricting the exercise of legislative power by the States, in their most 
ordinary and usual functions, as in its judgment it may think proper on all such subjects. And still 
further, such a construction followed by the reversal of the judgments of the Supreme Court of 
Louisiana in these cases, would constitute this court a perpetual censor upon all legislation of the 
States, on the civil rights of their own citizens, with authority to nullify such as it did not approve 
as consistent with those rights, as they existed at the time of the adoption of this amendment. The 
argument, we admit, is not always the most conclusive which is drawn from the consequences 
urged against the adoption of a particular construction of an instrument. But when, as in the case 
before us, these consequences are so serious, so far-reaching and pervading, so great a departure 
from the structure and spirit of our institutions; when the effect is to fetter and degrade the State 
governments by subjecting them to the control of Congress, in the exercise of powers heretofore 
universally conceded to them of the most ordinary and fundamental character; when in fact it 
radically changes the whole theory of the relations of the State and Federal governments to each 
other and of both these governments to the people, the argument has a force that is irresistible, in 
the absence of language which expresses such a purpose too clearly to admit of doubt. We are 
convinced that no such results were intended by the Congress which proposed these amendments, 
nor by the legislatures of the States which ratified them.”). 
 20. Id. at 78. For an interesting set of questions regarding Slaughter-House and federalism, 
see YOUNG, supra note 4, at 226–27. 
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disadvantaged African Americans,21 apparently viewed the Due Process Clause 
as simply affording fair procedures,22 and held that the sort of claim the butchers 
made was not within the limited set the Privileges or Immunities Clause 
protected against state action.23 
Justice Miller’s narrowing strategies were inconsistent with the history of 
the framing and ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, at least in limiting 
Section 1 to African Americans and confining the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause as he did.24 This Essay is not the occasion to do more than sketch with a 
broad brush the subsequent developments with general reference to some of the 
constitutional historians whose work provides a closer look.25 Although the 
Court has adhered to a narrow view of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, it 
has rejected Justice Miller’s definitions of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due 
Process and Equal Protection Clauses and, in so doing, has allowed the 
Amendment to become transformational somewhat in the way the majority 
feared in the Slaughter-House Cases. 
II.  THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT’S STREAMS OF TRANSFORMATION 
The expansion of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses was 
consequential, but the changes did not happen immediately once the Fourteenth 
Amendment was added to the Constitution. Nor did they follow in a linear 
fashion. The changes occurred through a) the application of rights against state 
government which were previously recognized only as existing against the 
federal government; b) the growth of the Equal Protection Clause; and c) the 
expansion of the Due Process Clause. 
A. Incorporation 
Although the Privileges or Immunities Clause seemed the most logical 
vehicle to incorporate substantive rights as against the states,26 the Slaughter-
 
 21. Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. at 81 (“We doubt very much whether any action of a State not 
directed by way of discrimination against the negroes as a class, or on account of their race, will 
ever be held to come within the purview of this provision. It is so clearly a provision for that race 
and that emergency that a strong case would be necessary for its application to any other.”). 
 22. Id. at 80–81. 
 23. Id. at 73–78. 
 24. See WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL PRINCIPLE 
TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINE 163–64 (1988). 
 25. See, e.g., BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT: THE STRUCTURE OF A 
CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION 56 (1998); MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL 
RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY (2004); RICHARD 
KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE (1975); NELSON, supra note 24, at 165–200. 
 26. ELY, supra note 13, at 18, 22–30. 
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House Cases were deemed to eliminate that option notwithstanding some 
occasional judicial suggestions to the contrary.27  
Yet largely during the twentieth century the Court has, with few exceptions, 
made virtually all provisions of the Bill of Rights applicable as against the states 
through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The process 
began in 1897 when the Court effectively held that the Clause applies the Fifth 
Amendment’s Takings Clause as against state action28 and continued most 
recently in McDonald v. City of Chicago29 where the Court held, 5-4, that the 
individual Second Amendment right recognized two years earlier,30 through the 
Fourteenth Amendment, limited state and local government. There, only a 
plurality thought the Due Process Clause was the vehicle of incorporation and 
Justice Thomas relied on the Privileges or Immunities Clause.31 
Incorporation of rights as against the states did not occur immediately or 
inexorably. The subject provoked much debate along the way.32 During the early 
twentieth century, the Court applied the Due Process Clause to make the First 
Amendment’s protections of speech and press applicable to the states.33 Justice 
Brandeis observed in 1927 in Whitney v. California that “[d]espite arguments to 
the contrary which had seemed to me persuasive, it is settled that the due process 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applies to matters of substantive law as 
well as to matters of procedure. Thus, all fundamental rights comprised within 
the term liberty are protected by the Federal Constitution from invasion by the 
States.”34 The Court confirmed within two decades that the Due Process Clause 
 
 27. See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 166 (1968) (Black, J., concurring) (“I can 
say only that the words ‘No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges 
or immunities of citizens of the United States’ seem to me an eminently reasonable way of 
expressing the idea that, henceforth, the Bill of Rights shall apply to the States.”); McDonald v. 
City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 806 (2010) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“Instead, the right to keep and 
bear arms is a privilege of American citizenship that applies to the States through the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause.”). Cf. Duncan, 391 U.S. at 166 n.1 (Black, J., 
concurring) (“My view has been and is that the Fourteenth Amendment, as a whole, makes the Bill 
of Rights applicable to the States. This would certainly include the language of the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause, as well as the Due Process Clause.”). 
 28. Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 241 (1897). 
 29. 561 U.S. 742, 791 (2010). 
 30. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
 31. McDonald, 561 U.S. at 806. 
 32. See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 47–125 (1947) (opinions of Reed, Black, 
Frankfurter, and Murphy); see also AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 137–40 (1998). 
 33. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 707 (1931); Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380, 387 (1927); 
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925). 
 34. 274 U.S. 357, 373 (1927). 
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incorporated the First Amendment,35 yet as John Raeburn Green pointed out at 
the time, the process was slower in cases dealing with criminal procedure.36 
The Court rejected the idea that the Fourteenth Amendment applied the Bill 
of Rights as against the states in Palko v. Connecticut.37 Ten years later, the 
Court concluded that the Fifth Amendment’s privilege against self-incrimination 
did not apply as against the states.38 Writing for the majority, Justice Reed 
embraced the conclusion of the Slaughter-House Cases and restated Justice 
Miller’s distinction that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibited states from 
infringing privileges or immunities of federal, but not state, citizenship, a 
dichotomy that safeguards federalism39 in addition to its other consequences. 
Moreover, the majority rejected the argument that the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
Due Process Clause made the Fifth Amendment’s privilege against self-
incrimination applicable as against the states.40 Adamson, however, triggered a 
judicial discussion between the New Deal Justices regarding how to determine 
what rights the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated against the states and the 
appropriate methodology for incorporating those rights.41 Whereas Justice Black 
argued for incorporation of the entire Bill of Rights, Justice Frankfurter argued 
that approach undermined state experimentation that could lead to greater 
protection of liberty.42 
Yet some of the guarantees of the Bill of Rights regarding criminal 
procedure had been selectively applied as against the states by mid-century43 
and the Warren Court embraced and accelerated the project during the 1960s.44 
In all, the Court has held that the Fourteenth Amendment includes and protects 
as against state action every right in the first eight amendments except the no 
quartering of soldiers protection of the Third Amendment, the grand jury 
indictment provision of the Fifth Amendment, the civil trial jury right of the 
Seventh Amendment, and the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth 
 
 35. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 7–8, 15, 17–18 (1947); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 
U.S. 296, 303 (1940); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 160 (1939). See generally John Raeburn 
Green, The Bill of Rights, the Fourteenth Amendment and the Supreme Court, 46 MICH. L. REV. 
869 (1948). 
 36. Raeburn Green, supra note 35, at 876–95. 
 37. 302 U.S. 319, 323 (1937). 
 38. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 54 (1947). 
 39. Id. at 53 (“It accords with the constitutional doctrine of federalism by leaving to the states 
the responsibility of dealing with the privileges and immunities of their citizens except those 
inherent in national citizenship. . . . This construction has become embedded in our federal system 
as a functioning element in preserving the balance between national and state power.”). 
 40. Id. at 53–55. 
 41. See id. at 47–125 (opinions of Reed, Black, Frankfurter, and Murphy). 
 42. Id. at 67–68 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
 43. See generally Raeburn Green, supra note 35, at 876–78. 
 44. PHILIP B. KURLAND, POLITICS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE WARREN COURT 73–82 
(1970). 
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Amendment.45 Writing in 1968, Justice Black noted that through selective 
incorporation the Court had almost reached the total incorporation destination 
he had prescribed twenty-one years earlier in Adamson, making him a “happy” 
Justice regarding the outcome, if not the methodology. 46 
Justice Harlan saw less reason for joy. He complained of the near total 
incorporation on the centennial of the Fourteenth Amendment. Such extensive 
incorporation “put the States in a constitutional straitjacket with respect to their 
own development in the administration of criminal or civil law,” he wrote.47 
Justice Harlan thought imposition of a uniform national constitutional norm 
interfered with the states’ ability to function as laboratories of democracy.48 
Justice Black dismissed these concerns that incorporation “interferes with our 
concept of federalism in that it may prevent States from trying novel social and 
economic experiments” since he “never believed that under the guise of 
federalism the States should be able to experiment with the protections afforded 
our citizens through the Bill of Rights.”49 More recently, Justice Alito, speaking 
for himself, Chief Justice Roberts, and Justices Scalia and Kennedy, rejected a 
federalism-based argument against incorporating the Second Amendment. He 
acknowledged that: 
[I]ncorporation of the Second Amendment right will to some extent limit the 
legislative freedom of the States, but this is always true when a Bill of Rights 
provision is incorporated. Incorporation always restricts experimentation and 
local variations, but that has not stopped the Court from incorporating virtually 
every other provision of the Bill of Rights.50  
He wrote that under the Court’s precedents, “if a Bill of Rights guarantee is 
fundamental from an American perspective, then, unless stare decisis counsels 
otherwise, that guarantee is fully binding on the States and thus limits (but by no 
means eliminates) their ability to devise solutions to social problems that suit 
local needs and values.”51  
Incorporation has had an enormous impact. Federal constitutional rights that 
once existed only against the national government now apply as against the 
states. This new set of rights as against state government covers an area virtually 
as broad as the Bill of Rights—speech, press, assembly, religion, gun possession, 
police conduct in connection with searches and seizures and interrogation, the 
 
 45. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 765 n.13 (2010). 
 46. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 164 (1968) (“I am very happy to support this selective 
process through which our Court has since the Adamson case held most of the specific Bill of 
Rights’ protections applicable to the States to the same extent they are applicable to the Federal 
Government.”). 
 47. Id. at 175–76. 
 48. Id. at 193. 
 49. Id. at 170. 
 50. McDonald, 561 U.S. at 790 (footnote omitted). 
 51. Id. at 784–85. 
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criminal justice system, and state and local confiscation, invasion, and regulation 
of private property. A wide assortment of state and local conduct is now subject 
to federal constitutional norms to be applied by federal, as well as state, jurists. 
Space does not allow a full survey of the cases but a better appreciation of 
the impact of incorporation may come from taking a brief, closer look at one 
area. The incorporation of the religion clauses has subjected public schools to 
the requirements of the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses, which have 
inhibited activities that would otherwise occur in some jurisdictions. Public 
schools cannot, for instance, require a religious objector to salute the flag in 
violation of his or her religious beliefs,52 or present a school-sponsored prayer 
whether the prayer is prepared by the school53 or is a Bible reading,54 or, at 
graduation.55 They cannot offer a moment of silence for voluntary prayer,56 or 
display religious symbols in the classroom.57 States are limited regarding the use 
of public monies to support religious activity.58 These decisions are simply a 
subset of those relating to public schools. Other cases involving one or both 
religion clauses address public display of religious symbols,59 prayer at the state 
legislature and local government meetings,60 religious belief as a basis for 
exemption from employment obligations,61 and exempting religious 
organizations from reporting requirements imposed on other charities.62 Even 
when the Court has upheld challenged behavior, incorporation has made state 
and local officials subject to constitutional norms set forth in the Bill of Rights 
that formerly applied only to the federal government. 
B. Substantive Due Process 
The expansion of the Fourteenth Amendment has also occurred through the 
development of the doctrine of substantive due process. John Hart Ely famously 
described substantive due process as “a contradiction in terms—sort of like 
‘green pastel redness.’”63 But the oxymoronic quality of substantive due process 
has not destroyed its constitutional significance. Perhaps allowance has been 
made for the Due Process Clause to do some of the work the Fourteenth 
 
 52. West Virginia v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 641–42 (1943). 
 53. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 430–32, 436 (1962). 
 54. Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223 (1963). 
 55. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 599 (1992). 
 56. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 59–61 (1985). 
 57. Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 42–43 (1980). 
 58. Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 690, 693 (1994); 
Grand Rapids Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 397 (1985). 
 59. County of Allegheny v. ACLU 492 U.S. 573, 578–79 (1989). 
 60. Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811 (2014). 
 61. Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 717–18 (1981). 
 62. Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982). 
 63. ELY, supra note 13, at 18. 
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Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause was supposed to do before 
Justice Miller sidelined it or, as Richard H. Fallon Jr. suggests, perhaps “some 
outcomes . . . are so substantively unfair that no process that produced them 
could count as ‘due.’”64 
Although the Court rejected the idea that the Due Process Clause 
encompassed plaintiffs’ substantive claims in the Slaughter-House Cases, a few 
years later it accepted the idea that the Due Process Clause limited the states’ 
regulatory power.65 It embraced the idea that the Clause protected substantive 
rights of liberty of contract and property rights at the end of the nineteenth 
century.66 In Lochner v. New York, the Court signaled a willingness to scrutinize 
police power legislation to determine whether liberty of contract or property 
rights were violated.67 Only Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. dissented68 from 
the idea that the Clause conferred substantive protection.69 The jurisprudence of 
the Lochner period made the Due Process Clause an instrument whereby the 
Court could subject state police power regulations to strict review under the 
constitutional norm of liberty of contract.70 Writing in 1930, Professor Felix 
Frankfurter recognized the end of slavery and “the participation of the Negro in 
the free life of the nation” as “political changes of stupendous meaning” but 
thought “even more important consequences, perhaps, flow from the new 
subjection of the states to national control through the effectual veto power 
exercised by the Supreme Court over state legislation” thanks to the Fourteenth 
Amendment.71 During the first third of the twentieth century the Court used 
substantive due process to strike down state (and occasionally federal) 
legislation regulating economic matters until it effectively abandoned Lochner 
in Nebbia v. New York72 and West Coast Hotel v. Parrish73 during the mid-
1930s. Nebbia announced a more deferential standard of review74 and West 
Coast Hotel retreated from recognition of liberty of contract as a robust 
constitutional right.75 “The day is gone when this Court uses the Due Process 
 
 64. FALLON, supra note 17, at 81–82. 
 65. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 125, 134 (1877). 
 66. See Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 589–90 (1897). 
 67. 198 U.S. 45, 56 (1905). 
 68. Id. at 74–76. 
 69. See CUSHMAN, supra note 25, at 56. 
 70. See, e.g., Lochner, 198 U.S. at 56. 
 71. FELIX FRANKFURTER, THE PUBLIC AND ITS GOVERNMENT 43 (1930). 
 72. 291 U.S. 502, 537–38 (1934). See generally CUSHMAN, supra note 25, at 80–83. 
 73. 300 U.S. 379 (1937). 
 74. Nebbia, 291 U.S. at 537 (“If the laws passed are seen to have a reasonable relation to a 
proper legislative purpose, and are neither arbitrary nor discriminatory, the requirements of due 
process are satisfied . . . .”). 
 75. Parrish, 300 U.S. at 391–92 (“What is this freedom? The Constitution does not speak of 
freedom of contract. It speaks of liberty and prohibits the deprivation of liberty without due process 
of law. In prohibiting that deprivation, the Constitution does not recognize an absolute and 
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Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to strike down state laws, regulatory of 
business and industrial conditions, because they may be unwise, improvident, or 
out of harmony with a particular school of thought,” declared Justice William 
O. Douglas for a unanimous Court in 1955.76 
Substantive due process was widely disparaged especially by New Deal 
Justices like Black77 and Douglas.78 Douglas’s extreme aversion to the doctrine 
led to some creative outcomes. In Skinner v. Oklahoma, he excoriated a law 
providing for sterilization of certain repeat criminals in language suggestive of 
a substantive due process analysis but decided the case instead under the Equal 
Protection Clause.79 Douglas’s resistance to substantive due process made his 
penumbras approach more appealing to him in Griswold v. Connecticut80 since 
it allowed him to construct an argument more consonant with Justice Black’s 
total incorporation approach. He found the right of marital privacy in the 
penumbras of various parts of the Bill of Rights, and these were applied as 
against the states by the Fourteenth Amendment.81 Others, however, found the 
right of marital privacy a protected Fourteenth Amendment “liberty” interest 
without reference to the Bill of Rights.82 The Court soon embraced substantive 
due process more directly, first in Loving v. Virginia83 as an alternative ground 
of decision and then in Roe v. Wade.84 
 
uncontrollable liberty. Liberty in each of its phases has its history and connotation. But the liberty 
safeguarded is liberty in a social organization which requires the protection of law against the evils 
which menace the health, safety, morals and welfare of the people. Liberty under the Constitution 
is thus necessarily subject to the restraints of due process, and regulation which is reasonable in 
relation to its subject and is adopted in the interests of the community is due process. This essential 
limitation of liberty in general governs freedom of contract in particular.”). 
 76. Williamson v. Lee Optical Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955). 
 77. Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 728–30 (1963) (rejecting substantive due process). 
 78. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481–82 (1965) (“[W]e are met with a 
wide range of questions that implicate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Overtones of some arguments suggest that Lochner v. New York, should be our guide. But we 
decline that invitation . . . . We do not sit as a super-legislature to determine the wisdom, need, and 
propriety of laws that touch economic problems, business affairs, or social conditions.” (citations 
omitted)). 
 79. 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (“We are dealing here with legislation which involves one of the 
basic civil rights of man. Marriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and 
survival of the race . . . . He is forever deprived of a basic liberty.”). 
 80. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484. 
 81. Id. at 484–85; see also id. at 499 (Harlan, J., concurring) (recognizing, but objecting to, 
Justice Douglas’s argument); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 167–68 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring) 
(accusing Griswold majority of purporting to avoid substantive due process). 
 82. See, e.g., Griswold, 381 U.S. at 500 (Harlan, J., concurring); id. at 502 (White, J., 
concurring); see also id. at 511–16 (Black, J., dissenting) (criticizing Harlan and White for 
accepting substantive due process). 
 83. 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967). 
 84. 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (“This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action, as we feel it is . . . .”). 
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The Court proceeded to recognize more categories of fundamental rights 
protected against state action by the Due Process Clause. In addition to the right 
of a married85 or unmarried couple86 to use contraceptives, the right to 
marriage,87 and a woman’s right to terminate her pregnancy,88 the Court found 
rights relating to certain family relationships,89 and the rights of a same-sex 
couple to engage in consensual intimate sexual conduct90 and to marry.91 
Although some Justices have tried to cabin the reach of the doctrine,92 it has 
most recently been the primary constitutional basis for the Court’s holding 
striking down state laws that limit marriage to a man and a woman.93 
The Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause has accordingly provided 
a basis for the Court to extend substantive protection to a number of “liberty” 
interests without reference to the Bill of Rights. In doing so, various areas once 
viewed as within state regulatory power are now subject to federal constitutional 
norms. The categories sketched above include some basic areas including 
marriage, family life, and sexual behavior. Many of these areas raise 
controversial matters and yet local communities must now comply with national 
norms and are subject to federal judicial review to police compliance. 
C. Equal Protection 
The Slaughter-House Cases gave the Equal Protection Clause, like the Due 
Process Clause and Privileges or Immunities Clause, a narrow definition, 
concluding that it was essentially limited to cases challenging state action 
adverse to African Americans.94 Although the Court had occasion to apply the 
Clause in nineteenth-century cases alleging race discrimination,95 toward the 
end of the nineteenth century the Court restricted its use by regarding racial 
segregation as not a per se violation.96 When the Court struck down a state 
 
 85. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 481. 
 86. Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 686–87 (1977). 
 87. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384 (1978); Loving, 388 U.S. at 12. 
 88. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163–64. 
 89. See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753–54 (1982); Moore v. City of East 
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977). 
 90. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003). 
 91. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604–05 (2015). 
 92. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720–21 (1997) (stating that the Court 
will only recognize new liberty interests if the interest, carefully described, is deeply rooted in the 
United States’ history and tradition); Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 122–27 & n.6 (1989) 
(examining whether asserted liberty interest is consistent with American traditions after describing 
interest at most specific level). But see Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2602 (rejecting Glucksberg 
approach). 
 93. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2604–05. 
 94. 83 U.S. 36, 81 (1872). 
 95. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879); Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1879). 
 96. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
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statute prohibiting certain interracial sales of real property among white and 
black persons it did so by invoking substantive due process, not equal 
protection.97 In the mid-1920s Holmes derided an argument based on inequality 
as “the usual last resort of constitutional arguments.”98 
Yet a decade later the Court recognized in dicta that courts might need to 
scrutinize more carefully statutes discriminating against racial, religious, or 
ethnic minorities, especially if they had been subject to past prejudice.99 That 
idea represented an implicit association of the Equal Protection Clause with 
pluralism and an acceptance of a judicial responsibility to scrutinize more 
closely measures which denied various minorities their equal place in America. 
The Court developed more robust doctrine in a common law fashion100 in cases 
brought challenging racial segregation,101 initially in education102 and then in 
other areas103 as well. 
Brown was a turning point not merely because the Court jettisoned “separate 
but equal” in the context of education, but also because it effectively eliminated 
the doctrine from other areas, too. In so doing, the Court associated the Equal 
Protection Clause with the idea that America should be one community, not two, 
and that majorities should be sensitive to the messages their actions send to 
minorities.104 The equal protection norm was so powerful that the Court 
unanimously held that the same outcome was required as against the federal 
government even though the Constitution states no Equal Protection Clause 
applicable to it.105 “In view of our decision that the Constitution prohibits the 
states from maintaining racially segregated public schools, it would be 
unthinkable that the same Constitution would impose a lesser duty on the Federal 
Government,”106 wrote Chief Justice Warren. 
The Warren Court proceeded to implement a more robust equal protection 
norm in race discrimination cases by formulating a more rigid approach to 
govern classifications adverse to African Americans during the mid-1960s.107 
 
 97. Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 82 (1917). 
 98. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927). 
 99. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
 100. See DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 85–92 (2012). 
 101. See, e.g., Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950); McLaurin v. Okla. State Regents, 339 
U.S. 637 (1950); Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337, 345 (1938). 
 102. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954). 
 103. See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 184 (1964) (striking down law 
criminalizing cohabitation between white and black opposite-sex couples); Anderson v. Martin, 
375 U.S. 399, 401–02 (1964) (striking down state law requiring statement of race of candidate for 
political office). 
 104. See Joel K. Goldstein, Approaches to Brown v. Board of Education: Some Notes on 
Teaching a Seminal Case, 49 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 777, 790 (2005). 
 105. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954). 
 106. Id. at 500. 
 107. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1267, 1278 (2007). 
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The Court’s declining patience with discriminatory practices against African 
Americans was reflected in its rhetoric. Whereas the early Warren Court decided 
Brown based on the harmful effect of public school segregation on black 
children without specifically criticizing the makers of the laws compelling 
separation,108 the late Warren Court castigated laws forbidding whites and 
blacks to marry as impermissible vestiges of White Supremacy in Loving v. 
Virginia.109 During the last sixty or seventy years, the Court has applied the 
Equal Protection Clause to address discrimination against African Americans in 
a range of contexts formerly within the exclusive purview of state and local 
government.110 
Once the Equal Protection Clause developed in cases reviewing state 
practices discriminating against African Americans, claimants in other contexts 
successfully brought equal protection claims. Cases involving gender 
discrimination produced a full set of cases,111 which introduced a new level of 
scrutiny.112 Cases alleging gender discrimination were brought successfully by 
men,113 as well as women.114 The Court rejected the propriety of archaic gender 
stereotypes that limited economic and leadership opportunities for women.115 
Many of the gender discrimination cases challenged action by the federal 
government and thereby provided the Court occasion to further embed an equal 
protection component into the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.116 
Courts interpreted the Equal Protection Clause to regulate other forms of 
discrimination including that based on alienage,117 mental ability,118 birth 
outside of wedlock,119 and sexual orientation120 among other categories. 
 
 108. Brown, 347 U.S. at 494. 
 109. 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967). 
 110. See, e.g., Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399, 401–02 (1964); Brown, 347 U.S. at 483; 
Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950). 
 111. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996); Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 
458 U.S. 718 (1982); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979); Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975); Reed 
v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). 
 112. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976). 
 113. See, e.g., Hogan, 458 U.S. at 731; Craig, 429 U.S. at 204. 
 114. See, e.g., Stanton, 421 U.S. at 8; Reed, 404 U.S. at 73. 
 115. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533; Weinberger v. Weisenfeld, 420 U.S. 
636, 643 (1975). 
 116. See, e.g., Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 201–02 (1977); Weinberger, 420 U.S. at 638 
& n.2; Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 679, 691–92 (1973). 
 117. See, e.g., Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 217–18 (1984); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 
365, 376 (1971). 
 118. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 435 (1985). 
 119. See, e.g., Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 765–66 (1977). 
 120. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996). 
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More recently, whites have utilized the Equal Protection Clause to challenge 
state programs using racial classifications to extend educational,121 
employment,122 or electoral opportunities123 to disadvantaged minorities and to 
add diversity to public schools124 and universities.125 All Justices have viewed 
race classifications as requiring some elevated level of scrutiny.126 Although the 
Court has struck down some affirmative action plans,127 a majority of the 
Justices have recognized diversity as a compelling state interest that can 
sometimes justify considering race to benefit disadvantaged minorities.128 
Under the Equal Protection Clause, the Court accordingly scrutinized, and 
often struck down, state and local behavior regarding a wide range of 
institutions. Indeed, it even became the vehicle by which the Court resolved the 
2000 presidential election.129 The Clause became the provision through which 
the Court addressed a range of societal practices that mistreated African 
Americans, women, non-citizens, and other minorities based on religious or 
sexual identities or practices, national origins, or various other characteristics. 
III.  THE SUM OF THE TRANSFORMATIVE STREAMS 
The Fourteenth Amendment has clearly had a dramatic impact. Even if one 
disagrees with particular outcomes and concludes that the Amendment’s 
promise has not yet been fully redeemed, it is clear that it has transformed the 
Constitution and the way government operates. The impact of incorporation, 
substantive due process, and equal protection doctrine has been sweeping, as the 
preceding summary suggests. Many constitutional law students probably 
underestimate the effect of the Amendment, in part because much of the 
incorporated material from the Bill of Rights is generally covered in courses on 
criminal procedure, and in part because many of us probably fail to explore the 
 
 121. See, e.g., Fisher v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2205 (2016); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 
306, 316–17 (2003); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 249–51 (2003). 
 122. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 476–77, 485–86 (1989); Wygant v. 
Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 269–70 (1986). 
 123. See, e.g., Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 633–34 (1993). 
 124. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 709–11 (2007). 
 125. See, e.g., Fisher, 136 S. Ct. at 2205–06, 2208; Grutter, 539 U.S. at 311–17; Gratz, 539 
U.S. at 249–51. 
 126. See, e.g., Joel K. Goldstein, Beyond Bakke: Grutter-Gratz and the Promise of Brown, 48 
ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 899, 910–11, 920–24 (2004) (demonstrating that the Justices who addressed the 
issue agreed in Bakke, Grutter, and Gratz that some form of elevated scrutiny applied to race-based 
affirmative action). 
 127. See, e.g., Gratz, 539 U.S. 244; Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
 128. See, e.g., Grutter, 539 U.S. at 325 (majority opinion holding that student body diversity is 
compelling state interest that can justify use of race); id. at 387, 395 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) 
(agreeing that student body diversity can be compelling state interest that can justify use of race but 
dissenting on other grounds). 
 129. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
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Amendment’s overall effect and its implications with our students. And the 
cumulative impact of the Fourteenth Amendment is much greater than, and 
different from, the sum of the doctrinal changes in those three areas. 
First, the Fourteenth Amendment has proliferated rights as a means to 
protect individuals. It tilts the constitutional arrangement from one that relied 
heavily on structure to limit government tyranny to one that emphasizes a widely 
applicable more capacious set of rights. Some of that shift began with the 
addition of the Bill of Rights to the Constitution but those guarantees initially 
only constrained behavior of the national government and accordingly had a 
modest impact. The addition of the rights set forth in the Fourteenth Amendment 
and their development, and the incorporation of virtually the entire Bill of Rights 
as against the states, proliferated the constitutional rights Americans enjoyed as 
against government and extended those rights to more people over more 
subjects. And whereas interactions with the federal government were relatively 
rare, the newly-conferred rights applied as against state and local government, 
against the officials and institutions with which people were in regular contact. 
The Fourteenth Amendment is, in Bill Araiza’s words, “the primary source for 
the constitutional rights Americans enjoy against state misconduct.”130 
Second, the Fourteenth Amendment profoundly changed America’s 
constitutional structure. Most constitutional theories include structural argument 
as an accepted mode of constitutional interpretation. Arguments based on 
federalism, separation of powers, democratic accountability, pluralism, and so 
forth are among the Constitution’s foundational concepts even though the 
document does not use those words or terms. There is a tendency, however, to 
consider constitutional structure in many areas as based exclusively upon the 
original Constitution. Such an approach is problematic in failing to consider the 
way that constitutional text added by amendment affects the overall structure. It 
is particularly problematic when it ignores the transformational impact of the 
Fourteenth Amendment in reshaping the meaning of many of these structural 
concepts. 
Constitutional arguments which extract themes from the Constitution’s 
design must consider the structure as it now is, not as initially ratified or even 
simply as supplemented by the Bill of Rights. The Fourteenth Amendment 
imposed constitutional limits on state power and authorized Congress to 
legislate to enforce those limits. Shortly after Justice Miller lamented any 
sweeping shift of authority from state to federal government, the Court 
recognized that the Fourteenth Amendment had just such an effect in Ex parte 
Virginia, where it upheld a federal indictment against a state judge for excluding 
blacks from jury service in violation of federal law.131 In so doing, it recognized 
that the Fourteenth Amendment diminished state authority: 
 
 130. ARAIZA, supra note 6, at 15. 
 131. 100 U.S. 339, 340, 347 (1879). 
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Nor does it make any difference that such legislation is restrictive of what the 
State might have done before the constitutional amendment was adopted. The 
prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment are directed to the States, and they 
are, to a degree, restrictions of State power. It is these which Congress is 
empowered to enforce, and to enforce against State action, however put forth, 
whether that action be executive, legislative, or judicial. Such enforcement is no 
invasion of State sovereignty. No law can be, which the people of the States 
have, by the Constitution of the United States, empowered Congress to 
enact . . . . But, in exercising her rights, a State cannot disregard the limitations 
which the Federal Constitution has applied to her power. Her rights do not reach 
to that extent. Nor can she deny to the general government the right to exercise 
all its granted powers, though they may interfere with the full enjoyment of 
rights she would have if those powers had not been thus granted. Indeed, every 
addition of power to the general government involves a corresponding 
diminution of the governmental powers of the States. It is carved out of them.132 
Nearly a century and one-half of further development has further shifted the 
balance from state to national government. Although the Fourteenth 
Amendment has certainly not been the sole driver of that change, it has played 
an important part and it has provided textual support for some aspects of the 
shift. 
To be sure, the Constitution’s structure still envisions an important role for 
the states but one which is now heavily constrained in many areas by the 
Fourteenth Amendment. The Court has recognized that the Fourteenth 
Amendment changed the prior balance of power between federal and state 
government.133 It limited the sovereignty of the states by, for instance, allowing 
Congress to override the states’ sovereign immunity pursuant to Section 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.134 Accordingly, Congress’s power to enforce the 
Fourteenth Amendment added to its arsenal and allowed it to hold states 
accountable in ways not permitted under Article I powers.  
In addition to the Fourteenth Amendment’s significance for the meaning of 
federalism, it has important implications for the constitutional roots of pluralism. 
It has strengthened and made more visible that commitment. The equal 
protection norm commands not simply acceptance but equal treatment of 
persons of different races, nationalities, genders, religions, sexual orientations 
 
 132. Id. at 346. 
 133. Seminole Tribe v. Florida 517 U.S. 44, 65–66 (1996) (“Fitzpatrick was based upon a 
rationale wholly inapplicable to the Interstate Commerce Clause, viz., that the Fourteenth 
Amendment, adopted well after the adoption of the Eleventh Amendment and the ratification of the 
Constitution, operated to alter the pre-existing balance between state and federal power achieved 
by Article III and the Eleventh Amendment.”). 
 134. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976) (“When Congress acts pursuant to § 5, not 
only is it exercising legislative authority that is plenary within the terms of the constitutional grant, 
it is exercising that authority under one section of a constitutional Amendment whose other sections 
by their own terms embody limitations on state authority.”). 
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among other groups, and this commitment to pluralism is reinforced by the 
incorporation through the Fourteenth Amendment of the Establishment and Free 
Exercise Clauses. The power of the equal protection norm is reflected in the 
Supreme Court’s decisions reading equal protection into the Fifth Amendment 
to apply as against the federal government, in the cases showing respect for 
religious practices of small religious groups, and of the expanding protection for 
the rights of gay, lesbian, and transgender persons. 
Third, the application of the Bill of Rights to state and local government and 
the development of substantive due process and equal protection doctrine have 
given litigants much greater opportunity to subject state and local officials and 
institutions to federal constitutional review and have presented the Court with 
greater opportunity to shape the meaning of those provisions. The pool of 
potential cases is no longer limited to those coming from national government. 
They now may come from state and local officials and institutions as well. 
Fourth, the content of constitutional rights has largely developed in cases 
involving behavior of state and local, not national, government. It was, perhaps, 
not surprising that the equality norm developed primarily in a state and local 
context,135 since the concept of equal protection is set forth in the Fourteenth 
Amendment, not in the Bill of Rights. Yet the leading cases in many areas of the 
Bill of Rights and regarding substantive due process have also been cases 
involving state or local, not national, action.136 Think of the school prayer 
cases,137 of Roe v. Wade,138 of Obergefell,139 of Miranda.140 One can easily add 
to the list. 
Fifth, constitutional norms shaped in cases involving state and local 
behavior have also largely defined the constitutional rights against, and duties 
of, the federal government. Some of this phenomenon has occurred through 
incorporation.141 Incorporation is an important, though certainly not the 
exclusive way that state cases have produced constitutional norms applicable to 
the federal government. Although the Court used to note the absence of an Equal 
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Protection Clause applicable to the federal government,142 in Bolling v. Sharpe, 
the companion to Brown involving segregated schools in Washington, D.C., the 
Court stated:  
[T]he concepts of equal protection and due process, both stemming from our 
American ideal of fairness, are not mutually exclusive. The “equal protection of 
the laws” is a more explicit safeguard of prohibited unfairness than “due process 
of law,” and therefore we do not imply that the two are always interchangeable 
phrases. But, as this Court has recognized, discrimination may be so 
unjustifiable as to be violative of due process.143 
The Court went on to reason that the decision in Brown compelled the same 
result in Bolling even though no Equal Protection Clause limited the federal 
government.144 Over time, the Court has recognized an implicit equal protection 
component in the Fifth Amendment.145 In other contexts, the Court has 
announced a congruence principle mandates that equal protection analysis is 
identical under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.146 Perhaps this reverse 
incorporation is a response to the invitation of the Ninth Amendment. In any 
event, it is striking to see rights enumerated in the Fourteenth Amendment 
against the states now applied equally as against the federal government. 
Sixth, the creation of new constitutional norms limiting states promoted 
greater uniformity in state conduct regarding individuals. States could still 
function as laboratories of democracy as Justice Brandeis envisioned, but not in 
ways that interfered with newly recognized rights. To the extent constitutional 
norms govern, state and local behavior must be uniform, whether regarding 
school population, school prayer, police practice, or marriage, among other 
topics. 
The incorporation and reverse incorporation jurisprudence involving the 
Fourteenth Amendment serve as important reminders of the limits of textual 
interpretation. Justice Frankfurter observed in his Adamson concurrence that 
“[i]t ought not to require argument to reject the notion that due process of law 
meant one thing in the Fifth Amendment and another in the Fourteenth,”147 yet 
judicial decisions have produced just that result. The incorporation of various 
rights—speech, free exercise, double jeopardy, self-incrimination, takings, and 
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so on—through the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause meant, in 
essence, that the Clause has a different meaning in the Fourteenth Amendment 
than in the Fifth since its Fifth Amendment version presumably did not include 
the protections that the Bill of Rights stated elsewhere. Similarly, the recognition 
of an equal protection component in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment introduced into the earlier provision content absent from the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. 
The point is not that the text has no significance or that it can cavalierly be 
disregarded. It is rather that the Fourteenth Amendment experience has indicated 
that the Court often will allow other types of constitutional argument to prevail 
over textual argument when necessary in view of the consequences or the 
morality of the outcomes. 
Last, and certainly not least, the Fourteenth Amendment has transformed 
America by providing the basis for the creation of a much more just and 
inclusive society. One need not agree with every decision issued in its name to 
conclude that the Amendment has helped America better achieve its highest 
ideals of equality, liberty, and justice through the outcomes its text has allowed 
and inspired. 
Surely much work remains to be done. The constitutional journey the 
Fourteenth Amendment redirected continues. But the transformation that has 
occurred is something to applaud this sesquicentennial of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. And it is something worth sharing with constitutional law students, 
too. 
 
 
